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Internet
Filtering in China
T
he government of the People’s Republic of
China has a longstanding set of policies
restricting their citizens’ exposure to
information.1 The Internet poses a new challenge
to such censorship because of the breadth of
online content, the rapidity with which sources
of content can be moved or mirrored, and
because content sources are often remote from
Chinese jurisdiction. 
A desire to capture the economic benefits of
networked computing while maintaining control
over the public’s Internet exposure has led to a
variety of strategies to split the difference between
allowing unfettered access to the global Net and
refusing to countenance any deployment beyond
trusted elites.
We collected data on the methods, scope, and
depth of selective barriers to Internet usage
through networks in China. Tests conducted from
May through November 2002 indicated at least
four distinct and independently operable Internet
filtering methods — web server IP address, DNS
server IP address, keyword, and DNS redirection —
with a quantifiable leap in filtering sophistication
beginning in September 2002. 
As with most technical filtering regimes,
whether implemented at the client, Internet service
provider, or backbone level, no list of the sites
blocked or the methodologies used to block them
has been made available by those doing the filter-
ing. Further, while the government-connected
Internet Society of China (not a chapter of the
international Internet Society) has asked ISPs and
content creators to sign a pledge that includes self-
filtering, few official statements document that
government-maintained Web filtering exists, much
less the criteria employed and thresholds necessary
to elicit a block. We therefore investigated the
growing methods of Internet filtering, and collect-
ed and distributed a list of blocked sites and pages
on our web site at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
filtering/china — a diverse list that is large in
absolute terms, even if small relative to the size of
the Internet and to the total amount of still-
undocumented blocked content. Such a list lets us
assess the nature and scope of filtering in China,
paying particular attention to inaccessible non-
sexually-explicit Web sites. 
Testing Methods
Our testing relied on two separate data collection
methods — through modems and open proxy
servers. From 20 March to 6 May 2002, we con-
nected with an international telephone call by
modem using dialup accounts with several Chinese
ISPs. After 6 May, our modems were unable to
negotiate a handshake with modems answering at
any Chinese ISPs, a failure consistent across mul-
tiple phone lines, locations, multiple ISPs, and
points of presence in China. From 14 August to 12
November 2002 we connected to open proxy
servers in China. We selected open proxies and
determined their listed locations for tabulation
purposes using APNIC’s IP-WHOIS.
During testing, we requested 204,012 distinct
sites drawn from various Web indices (such as sites
listed in Yahoo Taiwan’s (tw.yahoo.com) directory
categories and Yahoo’s Taiwan subdirectory cate-
gories (http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/
Taiwan), and search results (such as search engine
Google’s top 100 results for a search on “China
freedom”). Most sites were accessible from China
just as from our standard Internet connection in
the United States, but we found that certain sites
were consistently unavailable. By attempting to
retrieve these sites repeatedly over time, from mul-
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Berkman Center for Internet & Society,Harvard Law Schooltiple locations in China, we drew inferences on
which specific sites among them were intention-
ally blocked by Chinese network staff. In this way,
we found that 18,931 sites were inaccessible from
at least two distinct proxy servers within China on
at least two distinct days while still accessible from
the US. 
The Scope of Filtering
We tested one URL per Web host — the default or
front page URL — based on reports, confirmed in
subsequent testing, that when the default page of
a site was filtered the entirety of that site was typ-
ically filtered. As a result, when we report a site as
inaccessible, the entire site was generally inacces-
sible — not just the site’s default or front page. 
To test the hypothesis of entire-site blocking,
we formed a sample of inaccessible Web hosts
and checked whether an arbitrary subdirectory
on each such site was inaccessible. Though the
arbitrary directory name we chose was intended
not to exist on the servers, typical Web servers
return a “not found” error message in response to
a non-existent request. These error pages them-
selves were inaccessible in 99.8 percent of the
tests. We attribute the other 0.2 percent to anom-
alies (such as transient network errors that might
have wrongly rendered the Web host inaccessible
in the first instance when the host was not inten-
tionally blocked).
At the moment, then, it seems that when the
host default page is blocked, all other pages on
that host are also blocked. Of course, the reverse
need not be the case, and we have separately
confirmed multiple instances in which it is not
the case. For example, China has blocked access
to http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china,
the Web site that contains much of our recent
writing about China’s filtering efforts. However,
the rest of the cyber.law.harvard.edu Web server
remains accessible. Thus, at least some blocking
appears to be triggered by relatively few key-
words in page URLs or contents, representing a
technical layer of blocking wholly distinct from
(and seemingly rarer than) an entire site being
made unavailable. See the “Filtering Implemen-
tations” sidebar on page 76 for more informa-
tion, including summaries of the newer DNS
server IP address, keyword, and DNS redirection
methods of Chinese Internet filtering.
When an entire Web host is filtered, our data
shows that this filtering typically operates on the
basis of the host’s IP addresses rather than on one
or several domain names. To confirm this, we
observed that when distinct Web sites are hosted
on a single Web server (as is typical in commercial
“shared hosting” at the lowest monthly rates),
blocking one Web site on a given server (with a
given IP address) requires blocking all Web sites
on that server. For example, we found 308 distinct
blocked sites (by domain name and differing page
content) all hosted on the server at IP address
216.34.94.186, a parking/redirection server used
by domain name registrar Dotster. This server
hosts additional Web sites beyond those we test-
ed, and it is highly likely that they too were
blocked. Indeed, a representative from domain
name registrar Enom reported that its primary
domain name forwarding service had been blocked
by China — rendering literally thousands of
domain names unreachable.
Sexually Explicit Content Filtering
A preliminary round of testing examined 795 dis-
tinct URLs containing sexually explicit images.
These URLs had been used as the basis for a por-
tion of Benjamin Edelman’s expert testimony in
Multnomah County Public Library, et al. v. Unit-
ed States (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
edelman/mul-v-us/). He generated this list by col-
lecting all 797 results from Google listings in
response to an October 2001 Web search using the
search criteria “free adult sex.” He removed two
pages because they didn’t include sexually explic-
it images. Of the 752 pages still providing content
at the time of our testing, 101 were blocked in
China (13.4%). Edelman previously found that
leading commercial filtering applications blocked
70 percent to 90 percent of these sites
(http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs
/aclu-113001.pdf). We infer from this that China
(unlike Saudi Arabia, given data at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia) has
not relied upon commercial filtering applications
to salt its own list of blocked sites of this sort.
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Most sites were accessible from China
just as from our standard Internet
connection in the United States,but 
we found that certain sites were
consistently unavailable.Non-Sexually Explicit Content Filtering
Our main testing examined Web sites drawn from
categories other than sexually explicit content.
We seeded this site list from multiple sources. For
example, we extracted from Yahoo all Web sites
in certain categories (including those specifical-
ly about education, entertainment, news, major
world governments, and politics) as well as all
sites in the non-English regional versions of
Yahoo that specifically concern China and Tai-
wan (cn.dir.yahoo.com and tw.dir.yahoo.com).
We conducted searches on terms likely to yield
sensitive results and thus candidates for block-
ing, both in English and in Chinese, using the
Google search engine, and placed the top results
into our list of URLs to test. We tracked approx-
imately 5,000 additional sites submitted by Inter-
net users to our Real-Time Testing System
(http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/test)
through September 2002, and we received email
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Figure 1.Proportion of sites blocked by Google search term. This figure reports the proportion of sites blocked,among sites
suggested by Google in response to searches on particular keywords.suggestions of further sites to test. The result of
these data sources was a list of 203,217 distinct
host names.
We found that a total of 18,931 of these sites
(9.3 percent) were blocked in China. A full listing
of blocked sites is available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/filtering/china.
Content Not Filtered
Many sites are not blocked in China, whether
because they have yet to be passed upon by the
authorities that determine blocks or because they
have been affirmatively found to be nonsensi-
tive. Sites not blocked might assist in drawing
inferences about what content among the
blocked sites is responsible for the differential
treatment, or how assiduously a given objection
to certain types of content is enforced. For
example, filtering of the official site for the Unit-
ed States Federal courts (uscourts.gov and all
subdomains) might indicate a desire to prevent
access to information about the American judi-
cial system, its processes, and its rulings — but
Findlaw, LexisNexis, and Westlaw all remain
accessible. Similarly, blocking of well-known
sexually explicit sites such as playboy.com and
penthouse.com suggests a purposeful decision to
restrict sexually explicit material — yet hus-
tler.com and whitehouse.com were consistently
accessible in our testing.
A Taxonomy of Blocked Sites
Our online report provides a full listing of some
19,000+ specific Web sites found to be inaccessible
from China. A full print listing of these many URLs
is beyond the scope of this article, but we report
below a general taxonomy of blocked sites.
We found that blocking varied across different
proxies in China, reinforcing the notion that
blocking is not done through a central bottleneck.
However, there is insufficient data to draw con-
clusions about systematic variations in blocking
across geographic locations; current data is con-
sistent both with intentional variations in block-
ing and with delays in updating block lists in cer-
tain regions. 
We obtained selected sites from Google search-
es on designated keywords. Figure 1 shows a sam-
pling of the sites blocked in response to searches
on specific keywords.
Dissident/Democracy Sites 
Of the top 100 sites Google returned, 40 were
blocked for a “democracy china” search, while 37
“dissident china” sites were blocked, 32 were
blocked for “freedom china,” and 30 for “justice
china.” Specific blocked sites included Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the Hong Kong
Voice of Democracy, the Direct Democracy Center,
and dozens of Falun Gong and Falun Dafa sites. 
Health
Of the top 100 Google results, 24 were blocked
for “hunger china,” 23 for “famine china,” 21 for
“AIDS china,” 19 for “sex china,” and 14 for “dis-
ease china.” Specific blocked sites included the
AIDS Healthcare Foundation, the Internet Men-
tal Health reference, and the Health in China
research project. We also found 139 sites listed in
Yahoo’s health directory categories and subcate-
gories blocked. 
Education
Several well-known institutions of higher educa-
tion, including the primary Web servers operat-
ed by Caltech, Columbia, MIT, and the University
of Virginia were blocked. Non-university sites
including the Learning Channel, the Islamic Vir-
tual School, the Music Academy of Zheng, and
the Web sites of dozens of public and private pri-
mary and secondary schools were also blocked.
We further found evidence of blocking of 696
sites listed in Yahoo’s education directory cate-
gories and subcategories. 
News
The BBC News was consistently unreachable.
CNN, Time Magazine, PBS, the Miami Herald, and
the Philadelphia Inquirer Web sites were often
unavailable as well. Of Google’s top 100 results
for news, 42 were blocked. We further found evi-
dence of 923 blocked sites listed in Yahoo’s news
and media directory categories and subcategories.
Nonetheless, some news sites that were previous-
ly blocked became accessible during the course of
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Several well-known institutions of
higher education,including the primary
Web servers operated by Caltech,
Columbia,MIT,and the University of
Virginia were blocked.our testing. For example, Reuters was blocked
through 29 April, but was subsequently accessi-
ble, while the Washington Post was blocked
through 6 May and was subsequently accessible.
This reduction in blocking of entire news sites
might reflect that certain new filtering technolo-
gies (including keyword-based filtering) that allow
blocking of particular sections and articles that
are particularly controversial in China. Thus, our
results should not be taken to suggest that every
Washington Post article is accessible in China,
even when the IP address of washingtonpost.com
is not blocked. 
Government Sites
Blocked sites included a variety of those operated
by governments in Asia and beyond. The entire
site of uscourts.gov, including the many federal
district and appellate courts in the United States,
as well as the United Kingdom’s Court Service
and Israel’s Judicial Authority were blocked. The
communication sites of various governments
were blocked, including the US government’s
Voice of America, as well as travel sites for Aus-
tralia, Israel, Korea, Switzerland, and Wales. Gov-
ernment military department sites were also
blocked, including the US Department of Defense,
though others remained reachable (such as the
CIA). A variety of additional government sites
were blocked, without manifest pattern, both in
the US and beyond. Examples include the site of
Seattle’s King County, the main Australian Fed-
eral Government index site, the Philippines
Bureau of Customs, the British Insolvency Ser-
vice, the Office of the Governor of Makkah in
Saudi Arabia, and the Legislative Assembly of
British Columbia. Blocked sites included 516 of
those in Yahoo’s categories and subcategories
pertaining to governments. 
Taiwanese and Tibetan Sites 
Blocked sites included business sites (like the
A&D Company of Taiwan), noncommercial sites
(the Taiwan Health Clinic and a total of 709
.edu.tw sites, as well as the Voice of Tibet), and
government sites (the Office of the President of
Taiwan and the Taiwanese Parliamentary Library
among 936 other Taiwanese government sites,
and the official Web site of “the Tibetan Govern-
ment in Exile”). More than 60 percent of Google’s
top 100 Tibet sites were blocked, as well as more
than 47 percent of the top Taiwan sites. Tai-
wanese content was also blocked disproportion-
ately, relative to its representation in our testing
sample; fully 3,284 .tw sites (13.4 percent of .tw
sites tested) were blocked, while our overall block
rate was approximately 9.3 percent. (Of course,
comparisons of block rates must be performed
with care given the subjective formation of the
list of sites tested. For lack of a domain name
specifically associated with Tibetan sites, it is
more difficult to perform such a comparison on
the block rate of Tibetan content.) 
Entertainment
Blocked sites included the movie Deep Impact, the
Canadian Music Centre, the Taiwanese site of MTV
(mtv.com.tw) and multiple sites providing off-color
jokes. We also found blocking of a total of 451
sites in Yahoo’s categories and subcategories per-
taining to entertainment. 
Religion
Blocked sites included the Asian-American Baptist
Church, the Atheist Network, the Catholic Civil
Rights League, Feng Shui at Geomancy.net, the
Canberra Islamic Centre, the Jewish Federation of
Winnipeg, and the Denver Zen Center. We found
1,763 sites in Yahoo’s categories and subcategories
pertaining to religion blocked. 
Conclusions
From our data over time, it appears that the set of
sites blocked in China is by no means static. Who-
ever maintains the block lists is actively updating
them, giving special attention to certain general-
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Related Web Resources
• Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China (electronic version with full listing of specific blocked sites):
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china
• Real-Time Testing of Internet Filtering in China:http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/test
• Replacement of Google with Alternative Search Systems in China:http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/google-replacements
• Internet Filtering in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia
• Documentation of Internet Filtering Worldwide:http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering
• Forbidden Sites Hijacked All Over China:www.dit-inc.us/report/hj.htminterest high profile sites where content changes
frequently. This is particularly noticeable with
news sites such as CNN and Slashdot. Some new
sites with sensitive content are promptly blocked.
However, even some longstanding sites of appar-
ent sensitivity remain unblocked. This is most eas-
ily noticed in our data for sexually-explicit sites
— we found blocking of only 13.4 percent of our
sample of well-known sexually-explicit sites —
but it is also anecdotally apparent from our find-
ing that, for example, some US intelligence sites
are blocked while others are accessible. Further
data collection will be geared toward determining
the extent to which the basket of sites blocked
reflects shifting substantive government policies
— whether, for example, a change in relations
with Taiwan is reflected in blocking, and if so,
how quickly. 
China’s Internet filtering efforts remain
opaque, and in the absence of government coop-
eration or admission of filtering methods, data
probing of the sort used in our study is intend-
ed to help determine the scope of filtering. We
have previously studied filtering in Saudi Ara-
bia and in American public libraries (http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia and
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/
mul-v-us); in these locations, blockage of a Web
page leads to an error message clearly explain-
ing that the requested page is unavailable due to
intentional blockage. In contrast, China’s sys-
tems make it difficult for a user to distinguish
between an intentional block and a temporary
network or server glitch. This might be by design
or might reflect technical happenstance — that
this implementation was easier or cheaper, given
the size and design of China’s network infra-
structure. But some newer forms of Chinese fil-
tering — namely, redirection of a request for a
sensitive Web site to another Web site — can be
either more or less obvious to the user than an
apparent network glitch, depending on whether
the substitution is noticed.
The Chinese government and associated net-
work authorities are clearly continuing to experi-
ment with different forms of blocking, indicating
that Chinese network filtering is an important
instrument of state Internet policy, and one to
which significant technical and human resources
continue to be devoted.
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Filtering Implementations
T
he “Filtering Implementations” sidebar on the
following pages has summaries about the Chi-
nese filtering practices,including the newer domain
name server IP address filtering,URL keyword fil-
tering, Web Server IP address filtering, HTML
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Filtering Implementations
O
n the basis of our testing,both auto-
mated and manual,we have reached
an increased understanding of the design of
filtering systems used to restrict Internet
access in China.We have observed certain
idiosyncrasies in Chinese methods of Inter-
net filtering,and in some instances we have
found methods to circumvent particular
aspects of filtering.Based on this data,we
can draw inferences about particular meth-
ods of filtering.
Web Server IP Address
We were able to confirm that filtering was
performed on the basis of IP address by
observing that when China blocked access
to one Web site on a given physical server,all
other sites on that physical server (that is,on
that IP address) were also typically blocked.
Our data suggest that when Chinese
network staff deem a site to contain unde-
sirable content, their most common
method of filtering it is simply to drop IP
packets destined for it.This method likely
relies on block lists loaded into border
routers that connect China’s internal net-
works with international networks. ISPs
reportedly share block lists,perhaps with
additional centralized coordination of
updates. Variation across networks and
over time is to be expected based on
delays in propagating list revisions.As a
result of these delays and variations,it is
often difficult to conclude that a site is
“blocked in China,” for a given site might
truly be reachable from some parts of
China and blocked from others.
This method of blocking, the most
widely used in our experience,is difficult to
circumvent. The typical circumvention
method relies on channeling Web page
requests and viewing associated results
through proxy servers or virtual private
networks located outside China. As others
have noted,1 however, monitoring and
proxy-blocking efforts provide a check on
the use of proxies.When Google’s cache
feature was available in China, it allowed
users to circumvent this method of filter-
ing, but this feature has since become
unavailable due to more selective Chinese
filtering of Google use,even as google.com
itself is,at the moment,accessible.
Domain Name Server IP Address
Like filtering on the basis of Web server
IP address, this method likely relies on
block lists loaded into border routers.Even
if the desired Web server is reachable, a
user’s computer cannot reach the Web
server if it cannot first convert the server’s
domain name into a numeric IP address —
and when the site’s DNS server is blocked,
no such conversion is possible.
We have observed that many of the fil-
tered DNS servers are also themselves
Web servers,or are located on networks
that are filtered in totality (as distinguished
from partially filtered networks for which
certain IP addresses are filtered while oth-
ers remain accessible).This lends some
support to the inference that DNS-level fil-
tering might be unintentional — an acci-
dental consequence of filtering a Web serv-
er or network that also happens to offer
domain name services.
When filtering operates on the basis of
DNS IP address,users can sometimes cir-
cumvent it by directly entering the desired
Web server’s IP address. In particular, an
interested user might simply enter the IP
address of the desired Web server direct-
ly into a browser’s location bar (into the
same location where the site’s domain
name would ordinarily be placed). Of
course,this method requires that the user
know the server’s IP address,and it further
requires that the server provide only this
single site (rather than hosting many sites
via HTTP multiplexing). Nonetheless, in
some situations entering an IP address
directly might circumvent Chinese filtering
efforts. Another possible circumvention
method is the use of non-Chinese DNS
servers, with such servers performing a
subset of the role that an overseas proxy
would serve to circumvent Web host IP
blocking.If such an approach became wide-
spread,border routers could be reconfig-
ured to refuse outbound DNS requests
except when received from authorized
DNS servers.
DNS Redirection
DNS servers in China have been found to
offer seemingly intentionally incorrect
answers to the IP addresses of certain
domain names.For 1,043 tested sites,we
confirmed that DNS servers in China
report a Web server other than the offi-
cial Web server actually designated via
each site’s authoritative name servers.We
call this phenomenon “DNS redirection,”
though others sometimes refer to the sit-
uation as “DNS hijacking.” Consistent
with prior reporting (www.dit-inc.us/
report/ hj.htm),our data show that such
sites were consistently unreachable in
their entirety.
When a user in China requests a site
affected by DNS redirection,for example,
the user’s computer is told that the site’s
domain name is associated with the IP
address 64.33.88.161.That IP address is
associated with the host www.falundafa.ca,
the site of a Canadian organization that
promotes the practice of Falun Gong.
However,that address is blocked by Chi-
nese border routers, preventing such
requests from reaching either the falundafa
server or any other.
While we cannot know for sure the
specific rationale for implementing this
additional filtering method, we suggest
two possible understandings.First,this fil-
tering method might be intended to sup-
plement border router filtering.Depend-
ing on the specific implementation
method,it might be somewhat more effi-
cient or easily updated by Chinese net-
work staff, and ISP compliance can be
more easily monitored remotely via ordi-
nary DNS tools such as “dig.” Second,this
filtering method is a likely precursor to
efforts both to monitor access to specific
sites and to revise or replace content on
those sites with other content specifically
provided by Chinese network staff.Either
approach would rely on proxy servers
placed at specified IP addresses and would
require that requests for designated sites
in some way be redirected to those
addresses.While this second theory is
largely speculative, it dovetails with the
Chinese efforts we have documented to
replace (and not simply block) Google,
and subsequent filtering of certain Google
search terms (including the names of key
political figures and the terms required to
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Filtering Implementations (continued)
use the Google cache).
Use of non-Chinese DNS servers
bypasses this filtering method, though
future use might be blocked by border
routers.
URL Keyword Filtering
Beginning in September 2002, our data
reflects that a subscriber to a Chinese ISP
would receive no response when seeking a
URL that contained certain words or phras-
es.This effect was particularly notable at
Google,where names of key political figures
are apparently off-limits,as are certain other
words used to invoke particular Google fea-
tures (among them the caching feature that
can provide a method of circumventing the
filtering implementations described above).
In some instances,we have also observed
that these keyword blocks apply equally to
requests from other sites.From at least cer-
tain locations in China,attempts to retrieve
any URL containing the character string
“jiang+zemin” triggers a distinct kind of
temporary filtering (even if the result of that
request would only be a “404 — Not
Found” error page).
Subsequent to a request for a URL with
a prohibited term, we have confirmed
“timeout” periods of 5 to 30 minutes dur-
ing which either the target site or even all
sites (including otherwise-unfiltered sites)
became inaccessible.We have received fur-
ther reports that some timeout periods
can last until a user’s computer is reboot-
ed or until a user’s DSL modem is power-
cycled. If intentional, as seems likely, this
represents a type of filtering that tries to
“train” the end user to avoid using prohib-
ited terms,imposing a penalty beyond mere
inaccessibility of the requested URL should
the terms be used.
This method of filtering is likely imple-
mented via packet-filtering systems inte-
grated into border routers or placed
adjacent to them.We have observed that
keyword-based filtering systems tend to
search for plaintext in URL strings —
searching for the word “cache,” for exam-
ple,and blocking any request to Google
that contains this word in its URL.How-
ever, the HTTP RFC specification
describes additional techniques for
encoding (“escaping”) characters in a
URL.2 For example,plain text characters
can be encoded via escape sequences of
the form %4A where 4A is the hexadeci-
mal code of the ASCII character at issue.
We have confirmed that in at least some
instances,Chinese filtering systems of this
sort are not currently triggered by
escape-sequenced keywords that,when
expressed in plain text,consistently pre-
vent access to the requested pages.(This
errata reflects a failure to properly
implement the comparison specified in
RFC 2616,section 3.2.3.) 
HTML Response-Keyword Filtering 
Beginning in September 2002,we observed
that certain keywords within Web page data
being transmitted to a Chinese Internet
user triggered filtering of that data.In par-
ticular,even when a page came from a serv-
er not otherwise filtered,and even when
the page featured a URL without contro-
versial search terms,it might nonetheless
be inaccessible if the page itself contained
particular controversial terms.Such pages
were often – but not always – truncated,
that is,interrupted midway through their
display.
On certain browsers,including recent
versions of Microsoft Internet Explorer,
pages truncated in this way might flash
briefly on screen,then disappear.This phe-
nomenon represents an augmentation of
“compiled” filtering with “interpreted” fil-
tering — the former representing specific
sites deemed ex ante to be off limits,with
routers configured accordingly,and the lat-
ter representing data deemed on-the-fly
(mechanically),to be off limits,with corre-
sponding temporary loss of access to the
source of that data.
The observed results are precisely
what would be expected if Chinese bor-
der routers (or associated hardware)
implemented a packet-filtering system
triggered by particular controversial key-
words.To reduce memory and processor
requirements,such systems promptly pass
on all packets found to be acceptable.
However,upon receiving the first packet
containing a prohibited term,a packet-fil-
tering system would be configured to dis-
card all further packets from the same
source and destination for some desig-
nated period — causing the page trunca-
tion consistently observed under these
circumstances.Observed disuniformity of
filtering might reflect that packet filtering
operates at less than line speed,that is,it
can inspect only a portion of content
passing through a given router. It might
also reflect that packet filtering fails to
take account of borders between packets,
such that a page is permitted to be viewed
if a part of a prohibited word is received
in one packet and the remainder in a sub-
sequent packet.Some prohibited requests
yielded timeout periods.
Based on our understanding of the like-
ly implementation method of such filter-
ing, we note two possible means of cir-
cumventing this filtering. First, content
providers can escape their text, using
HTML markup that is equivalent to the
characters at issue or adding HTML white-
space (comment tags, and so on) in the
middle of controversial words or phrases.
(These techniques are documented in
HTML specifications for character entity
references and comments.) Second,Chi-
nese users can reduce their TCP/IP stack’s
specified maximum transmission unit
(MTU) — reducing the amount of text
contained in a given packet and thereby
reducing the effectiveness of packet-
inspection systems;however,this approach
typically reduces performance and also
increases network overhead.
In future work, we will seek to docu-
ment the specific keywords found to be
prohibited in searches, URLs, and HTML
response pages,and more important,the
evolving prevalence of each type of filtering.
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